Detelin Dimitrov: The Russian Black Sea Fleet and Crimea, key for future peace talks

The processes of globalisation after the Berlin Wall’s fall, together with the economic rise of powers with the will to be global, challenged the unipolar model of the world that naturally emerged after the Cold War concluded. This exacerbated the need for a revision, which included the restoration or even expansion of the powers’ spheres of influence. Dissatisfaction with the unipolar model of the world order led to a strong wave of anti-Americanism in the eastern and southern hemispheres, which culminated in the war in Ukraine, with the idea that Russia would spearhead the resistance to the model imposed for the last thirty years.

After the start of the so-called “special military operation”, two main dimensions have emerged; the regional and the global. In the regional dimension, it was argued by Moscow that it was forced to take military action, to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, and a similar explanation was used to defend the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russian forces in 2014. Globally, to justify the invasion, the Russian state and military leadership argued that the West had been applying constant pressure, with NATO increasingly expanding upon Russian land and sea borders, thus resulting in an act of protection.

It is more than likely that military-strategic arguments, rather than geopolitical, lead to the final decision for the invasion of Ukraine, and aside from the irritating for Moscow NATO presence near Russia’s borders, the fate and status of Russia’s Black Sea fleet and its capabilities in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean is rather important under these circumstances. Since the age of the Great Discoveries, it is impossible for a great empire to exist without a respectable naval and merchant fleet. This applies to global powers even to this day. Navies controlling marine trade routes, with straits being of great important, is clearly evident in the map of Europe. The Danish straits, that link the Baltic and the North Sea, are where the main traffic of tanker-transported Russian oil passes. The Hormuz Strait is strategically important for the passage of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf via the Red Sea and Suez into the Mediterranean. The Strait of Gibraltar is the door between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are similarly the gateway between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. All these marine passages are under the control of NATO member states, assisted by the 5th and 6th US fleets. If necessary, these transport “arteries” can be temporarily cut-off and the Russian Baltic Fleet (Kaliningrad) or Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol) can be blocked-off in the respective seas. With the Russian Caspian Flotilla (Astrakhan) being only regionally important, marine access for Russia could be unimpeded by the Northern Fleet (and its squadron ofnuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, part of the Russian nuclear triad), which is countered in

the Atlantic and North Sea by the 2nd , 4th and 6th U.S. fleets, as well as the Royal Navy of Great Britain. The Pacific Fleet, the second operational and strategic grouping of the Russian Navy, possesses at least a dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines that can also carry nuclear warheads. The U.S. Navy (stationed in Japan) has the dominant presence in the Pacific, with the 7th and 3rd U.S. fleets, with the Chinese and Japanese fleets becoming increasingly important in the Western Pacific.

Let us turn to some historical aspects that would help in understanding the current situation. Back in 1898, the Russian-Chinese Convention was signed, based on which Port Arthur (now Dalniy) and the near Liaotung Peninsula in the Yellow Sea were ceded to Russia on a concession basis for a 25 year period. Russia turned Port Arthur into a heavily fortified port, second in importance only to Vladivostok, for the Pacific Fleet of Tsarist Russia. It was pivotal for controlling Manchuria from the Yellow Sea and thus the Korean peninsula, making it a thorn in the side of the rapidly militarizing Japan, which also had ambitions set towards North China and Korea. In February 1904, Japan began sieging Port Arthur, and succeeded in capturing it on May of that year along with the remnants of the Imperial Pacific Fleet redeployed to Vladivostok after many attacks at the cost of many lives. Russia then attempted a series of unsuccessful land operations in Manchuria, which was eventually captured by Japan, and thus came the end of the Russian-Japanese War. Discontent over this loss was strong among the Russian officers, and directly led to the first revolution of 1905, and Russia’s continued defeats in World War I culminated in the October Revolution in 1917. All of this ultimately led to the demise of the Russian monarchy, and multimillion civilian and military casualties over the next few decades resulting from internal Stalinist purges and the aggression of fascist Germany.

Military-political thought in Russia remembers this tragic lesson. Could Sevastopol become the next ‘’Port Arthur’’ for Russia in the invasion of Ukraine? Absolutely not, Russia cannot and will not let that come to pass. The Sevastopol’s port is considered impregnable from the sea, and it is largely safe from land, but it is vulnerable to airstrikes. After the flagship cruiser of the Black Sea Fleet ‘’Moskva” was sinked by an Ukrainian missile, it became apparent that not a single target of the Ukrainian forces was protected. Both Russia and the United States realize that, which is why the US refrains and will most likely continue refraining from providing Ukraine with long-range missile systems that would be capable of striking and sinking nearly the entirety of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet before it even exits Sevastopol. This would set an ultimate precedent and cross all red lines, prompting Russia to instantly abandon the retaliatory strike doctrine in its nuclear deterrence strategy and use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, with all foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences for the belligerents, Europe and the world. In this

regard, following its withdrawal from the New START treaty, it is possible that Russia’s doctrine of retaliatory nuclear strike may develop unfavorably for world peace.

The Black Sea Fleet primarily operates within the confines of the Black Sea, and Russian warships can enter the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles only after permission is given for the purposes of exercises, patrols, maintenance and rotation at the Russian naval base at Tartus, which has been on concession since Soviet times until today under agreement with Syria. Because of the aforementioned limitations, the Black Sea Fleet is more defensive than offensive, posing a potential threat only to the countries of the Black Sea. At the same time, since the war’s onset, besides the Moskva cruiser, Ukrainian armed forces have sunk ten more Russian vessels, exposing its unexpected vulnerability. Therefore, the Black Sea Fleet should not be of strategic, but rather status and regional importance for NATO.

This isn’t how things are seen by Russia though. Sevastopol has homed the Black Sea Fleet since its inception in 1783, when Catherine the Great annexed Crimea in a Russian-Turkish war. The Fleet was seen as a key factor in Russia’s approach to the Balkans and, by blocking the Bosphorus, as an aegis, preventing entry of enemy ships into the Black Sea. Because of Sevastopol, the Crimean peninsula continues to be strategically important for Russia. By decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1954, Crimea was annexed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It is regarded as an illegitimate act by some Russian historians, being the result of administrative decision rather than referendum. Immediately after Crimea’s occupation by Russian troops in 2014, a referendum was held, the results of which provided a formal reason for its annexation to the Russian Federation.

It is difficult to judge from the prespective of today, but Crimea’s occupation in 2014 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 could have been prevented if the status of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet had been resolved before Ukraine’s independence in 1991. The issue was verlooked then, which has sprung a number of legal problems. Ukrainian law prohibits foreign military installations on its territory, yet a temporary exception had been made for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In 2010, then-President Viktor Yanukovych agreed to extend the concession of the port of Sevastopol, which was due to expire in 2017, for another 25 years, i.e. until 2042, with the possibility of a further extension. After his overthrow and defection to Russia, the Ukrainian authorities denounced the contract for Sevastopol, giving Russia a substantial reason to proceed with a forced annexation of the peninsula, under pretense of protecting the Russian-speaking population.

As shown form the developments of recent months, neither Russia or Ukraine can be defeated: Russia because of its territorial vastness and resources, relentlessness and social passivity, and Ukraine because of the West’s colossal help, public support, the unprecedented bravery and determination of Ukrainian troops to defend their homeland, and their quick learning of modern tactics and handling of Western weapons. In this background of operational stalemate, the Ukrainian forces are awaiting the delivery of Western armored vehicles, which they believe will suffice in breaking through and gaining an advantage, while the Russian side is wearing down the Ukrainian forces by seeking to hold the front line. Simultaneously, there are signs of Moscow’s tone softening, attempting to find flexible solutions that leave room for future political maneuvering. The statements of Russian Security Council Vice President Dmitry Medvedev clearly illustrate this. His threats of Russia using nuclear weapons have been replaced by a painfully true outcry: ‘’If Russia loses the war, it will fall apart!’’. Was this an appeal for help made to Russia’s strategic allies? The eventual collapse of Russia would have an effect on Eurasia many times greater than the detonation of the ‘’Tsar Bomba’’ (the most powerful atomic bomb ever created, capable of wiping an entire European country off the face of the earth). Medvedev’s conclusion probably coincided with that of the leadership of the People’s Republic of China, after which President Xi Jinping immediately sent one of his most trusted people to Moscow.

Of course during his visit Wang Yi, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign affairs office, backed Russia, but more importantly, China publicly said for the first time that it did not see a military solution to the conflict and made a call for peace. It is evident that this was not a ploy to buy time for Putin, but rather China expressing deep concerns at the prospect of severe destabilization of Russia for decades to come, which would have unpredictable economic and military-political consequences for its neighbors’ and international security. A prominent sign of future intentions of Russia’s leadership can be found in Putin’s speech on the anniversary of the start of the war: transforming local conflict into global confrontation. Putin’s words are generally unsettling for international order, but there is an upside, namely that Russia will seek to end the conflict in Ukraine by trying to shift it to a bloc confrontation, similar to the Cold War.

However, the war’s conclusion is still far. First, the idea of supplying the Ukrainian armed forces with Western armoured vehicles must be put into practice. It is possible that this will not lead to results, not because of lacking intelligence and motivation from the Ukrainian military, but because it is extremely difficult to interact, control and command armoured units with such diverse and hardly compatible equipment, not to mention logistical support, the impossibility of quick repairs in the field or in close depth, and the lack of solid ammunition stocks by NATO standards. Nor should the Russian fighters’ and commanders’ motivation to destroy Western counterparts be underestimated. The logical next step is ‘’scraping the bottom of the barrel’’ by utilizing the last reserves of Soviet equipment from the warehouses of former socialist countries, including Bulgaria. It is of great importance to achieve lasting parity between Russia and Ukraine by the end of this year or early next year, after which the parties will be convinced that neither can achieve an outright victory. Only then peaceful negotiations will be able

to end the conflict. Russia will not give up on its Black Sea fleet, and thus will defend what it acquired in 2014. It is within reason that Ukraine will regain Donbas and assert its statehood within the pre-war borders.

What would the lessons for Bulgaria be, given its complex domestic politics? After the elections, the president should get rid of the caretaker governments, for which he is directly responsible and as soon as possible. This will only result in loss for his personal rating. Such painful decisions should be taken in interest of national security. The next elected government will have to make bold and non-standard decisions that will compromise its popularity, so candidates for its formation should start thinking about a public strategy that will not sink the ruling parties in the upcoming local or possible parliamentary elections. Probably in early autumn, the government will have to prove its Euro-Atlantic solidarity, which could negatively effect a number of domestic political factors. Another request to empty wartime reserves may be forthcoming and impossible to decline and at that point an elected government must press on with our Western allies and fight not only to protect our home skies but also to provide adequate replacement capabilities. This shouldn’t be on the basis reciprocation, but focusing on the strategy for the development of our armed forces in the scope of 2030-2035, asking for the needed equipment and arms to build the future armed forces, tailored to Bulgarian conditions and maintenance capabilities. To that end, it is rather important to conclude offset deals and holding, and involve Terem and other state-owned production companies in the development, production and maintenance of military equipment and ammunition of NATO standards, which eventually wil be provided for free or purchased for the needs of the Bulgarian army. Bulgaria should take every opportunity for technological renewal and modernisation of the scientific and technical potential of the military-industrial complex, which would attract new foreign investment and create thousands of new jobs in the specific sector.

It is advisable for our foreign policy be fully harmonized with Euro-Atlantic processes, but at the same time be combined with realism in regards to the war in Ukraine. Active participation in the design of the new international security architecture should be emphasized, for the peaceful, lasting and sustainable construction of a predictable world of mutual respect and regard for the interests of both global powers and smaller states that fall within the ‘’spheres of influence’’ based on the fundamental principles of free choice for development and the protection of civil and human rights and freedoms. / BGNES.

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Detelin Dimitrov, Foreign Policy Observer. This analysis is written especially for BGNES.